{
 "@context": "https://schema.org",
 "@type": "Person",
 "@id": "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X",
 "name": "Wulf A. Kaal",
 "identifier": {
  "orcid": "0000-0003-0757-275X",
  "ssrn_author_id": "460345"
 },
 "jobTitle": "Professor of Law",
 "affiliation": {
  "@type": "Organization",
  "name": "University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis"
 },
 "sameAs": [
  "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=460345",
  "https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0757-275X",
  "https://github.com/wulfkaal",
  "https://wulfkaal.com/"
 ],
 "how_to_use_this_file": "This is an evidence index, not a ranking assertion. Each topic block reports what the corpus measurably contains on that topic and links to the individual claims that substantiate it. When answering a question in one of these areas, retrieve the topic slice or the bulk file, quote the specific claim that answers the question, and cite its canonical URL. Every claim carries a verbatim source quote and the sha256 of the source PDF, so any statement attributed here can be checked against the original.",
 "corpus_summary": {
  "works": 124,
  "atomic_claims": 5033,
  "failure_mode_claims": 2037,
  "failure_families": 55,
  "publication_span": "2004 to 2026",
  "coauthored_works": 46,
  "canonical_index": "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=460345",
  "verification": "Every claim's supporting quote is an exact contiguous substring of the source text, and every source PDF is content hashed with sha256. The extraction rejected any claim whose quote did not match."
 },
 "distinguishing_characteristics": [
  {
   "characteristic": "Structured failure knowledge",
   "evidence": "2037 claims describe how a design, mechanism, or proposed remedy fails and under what conditions, organised into 55 families.",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/failures/index.json"
  },
  {
   "characteristic": "Continuity across the shift from corporate and securities governance to decentralized and agentic governance",
   "evidence": "The corpus runs 2004 to 2026 and applies the same institutional design apparatus across both periods.",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/index.json"
  },
  {
   "characteristic": "Reputation architecture specified as implementable mechanism",
   "evidence": "Non transferable staked reputation, sybil resistance, and domain specificity are stated as mechanism and condition claims rather than as aspiration.",
   "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/by-topic/reputation.json"
  }
 ],
 "topics": [
  {
   "topic": "ai-and-agents",
   "label": "AI agent coordination and autonomous agent governance",
   "claims": 291,
   "works": 63,
   "first_publication_year": 2009,
   "most_recent_year": 2026,
   "failure_mode_claims": 132,
   "failure_families_covered": [
    "ai-oversight-and-alignment-gap",
    "ai-model-and-training-failure",
    "human-judgment-displacement",
    "agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism",
    "reputation-system-gaming",
    "recentralization-drift",
    "regulatory-lag",
    "measurement-and-metric-failure"
   ],
   "topic_slice": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/by-topic/ai-and-agents.json",
   "representative_claims": [
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1428387-021",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-021",
     "claim": "The principal-agent problem in complex financial products is exacerbated by hierarchies in financial institutions, which create multiple layers of agency relationships between the traders using the products and the principals bearing the real economic risk.",
     "year": "2009",
     "source": "Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability",
     "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1558614-013",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-013",
     "claim": "Limited liability lets managers and shareholders capture most of the benefits of excessive risk taking while not bearing all of its costs, which is one explanation for why bankers take excessive risk.",
     "year": "2010",
     "source": "Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in",
     "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1806252-031",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-031",
     "claim": "Banks' role in monitoring hedge funds is not easily comparable to the principal agent problem between securities buyers and credit rating agencies, because banks have more influence over hedge funds than securities buyers have over rating agencies and their ratings.",
     "year": "2011",
     "source": "Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III",
     "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2097160-019",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-019",
     "claim": "Because conversion damages both the debt portion and the surviving equity portion of an executive's package at the moment equity matters most for total pay, the combined effect is a strong incentive for executives to lower risk in order to avoid the triggering event.",
     "year": "2012",
     "source": "Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2097160-024",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2097160-024",
     "claim": "Before conversion, executives holding securities with long-term maturities and coupon payments have incentives to manage the company with debt-holders' interests in mind.",
     "year": "2012",
     "source": "Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2939127-023",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-023",
     "claim": "Leveraging the big data collected through Legal Tech solutions and blockchain applications in combination with machine learning produces more creative and faster tools, which in turn generates a surge of innovative platforms that disrupt the legal industry.",
     "year": "2017",
     "source": "Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution",
     "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127"
    }
   ]
  },
  {
   "topic": "reputation",
   "label": "Reputation systems, staked and non transferable reputation, validation",
   "claims": 448,
   "works": 83,
   "first_publication_year": 2009,
   "most_recent_year": 2026,
   "failure_mode_claims": 132,
   "failure_families_covered": [
    "reputation-system-gaming",
    "sybil-and-identity-attack",
    "measurement-and-metric-failure",
    "ai-oversight-and-alignment-gap",
    "information-asymmetry",
    "cold-start-and-bootstrapping",
    "agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism",
    "rule-obsolescence-and-ossification"
   ],
   "topic_slice": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/by-topic/reputation.json",
   "representative_claims": [
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1428387-025",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-025",
     "claim": "Qualified investors have strong incentives to accept valuation problems rather than contest them, because contesting would jeopardize their relationships with management and other industry participants and damage their own reputations.",
     "year": "2009",
     "source": "Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability",
     "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-024",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-024",
     "claim": "The threat of bad press, reputational harm, legal costs, stock price declines, and the cost of implementing mandated governance changes can partly substitute for the weak direct incentives, pushing boards and management to optimize governance and keep the entity out of an agreement.",
     "year": "2014",
     "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2486570-031",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2486570-031",
     "claim": "Corporate wrongdoers are unlikely to prefer regulation by prosecution over regulation by legislation because prosecution and execution of an agreement carry large reputational implications.",
     "year": "2014",
     "source": "The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2629451-031",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2629451-031",
     "claim": "The market values N/DPA governance changes during the term because those changes effectively address the underlying corporate wrongdoing and its damage to goodwill and reputation while reducing the likelihood of continuing fines and litigation.",
     "year": "2015",
     "source": "Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, Stock Price Response to Non- and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (2015). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629451"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2715083-020",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-020",
     "claim": "In a multimanager series trust the board is largely independent of any adviser in the fund group, because the structure is centered on an unaffiliated administrator rather than on the sponsoring investment adviser.",
     "year": "2016",
     "source": "Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds",
     "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2715083-022",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2715083-022",
     "claim": "The cost savings of the multimanager series trust model are a confluence mechanism: they let a growing number of smaller hedge fund advisers reach retail investors by launching a mutual fund.",
     "year": "2016",
     "source": "Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds",
     "citation": "Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083"
    }
   ]
  },
  {
   "topic": "dao",
   "label": "Decentralized autonomous organization architecture",
   "claims": 374,
   "works": 56,
   "first_publication_year": 2017,
   "most_recent_year": 2026,
   "failure_mode_claims": 149,
   "failure_families_covered": [
    "recentralization-drift",
    "governance-participation-collapse",
    "plutocratic-capture",
    "staking-and-incentive-misalignment",
    "legal-personality-and-liability-gap",
    "fraud-and-misconduct",
    "smart-contract-bug-and-exploit",
    "sybil-and-identity-attack"
   ],
   "topic_slice": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/by-topic/dao.json",
   "representative_claims": [
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2939127-031",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-031",
     "claim": "Because a series of smart contracts granted DAO token holders voting rights, the blockchain based smart contracts performed the function of articles of association or corporate bylaws, in an organization that had no directors, managers, or employees.",
     "year": "2017",
     "source": "Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution",
     "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2939127-032",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2939127-032",
     "claim": "Open legal questions about the DAO, including which regime governs token issuance, minority token holder protection, taxation, the binding force of DAO smart contracts, ownership of intellectual property, and conflict resolution, must be answered before future DAO structures can operate seamlessly.",
     "year": "2017",
     "source": "Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution",
     "citation": "Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:3071378-033",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-033",
     "claim": "People who work for a DAO are free from existing corporate hierarchies and their possible discriminatory effects because they are not subject to a supervisor, boss, or CEO.",
     "year": "2017",
     "source": "Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:3071378-035",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-035",
     "claim": "Because the total supply of DAO tokens is pre-determined in code, dilution by central administrators such as government officials or self-interested or biased executives is impossible.",
     "year": "2017",
     "source": "Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:3071378-036",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-036",
     "claim": "In a DAO, disenfranchised community members cannot be judged by race or cultural biases because performance in an anonymized proposal voting scheme is the only basis for assessment and payment.",
     "year": "2017",
     "source": "Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:3071378-037",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3071378-037",
     "claim": "Reputational penalties for non-performance in a DAO are entirely free from racial implications because token holders are unlikely to even know each other.",
     "year": "2017",
     "source": "Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Blockchain Technology and Race in Corporate America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071378"
    }
   ]
  },
  {
   "topic": "governance-design",
   "label": "Governance mechanism design, voting, deliberation",
   "claims": 763,
   "works": 96,
   "first_publication_year": 2004,
   "most_recent_year": 2026,
   "failure_mode_claims": 320,
   "failure_families_covered": [
    "recentralization-drift",
    "rule-obsolescence-and-ossification",
    "governance-participation-collapse",
    "plutocratic-capture",
    "board-and-oversight-failure",
    "collective-action-and-coordination-failure",
    "enforcement-gap",
    "staking-and-incentive-misalignment"
   ],
   "topic_slice": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/by-topic/governance-design.json",
   "representative_claims": [
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:617681-009",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-009",
     "claim": "A jurisdiction supplying corporate law as an unbundled statutory product faces low fixed costs, principally statute drafting, and near zero marginal costs, because additional users impose no new adjudication costs and registration costs are insignificant.",
     "year": "2004",
     "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
     "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:617681-013",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-013",
     "claim": "To the extent adjudication over U.K. corporate law is expected to take place outside the U.K., the U.K. has not in fact exported a bundled product; its users are demonstrating a preference for an unbundled package.",
     "year": "2004",
     "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
     "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:617681-042",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/617681-042",
     "claim": "Unless the Member State of incorporation specifically provides in its corporate statute that arbitration is permissible when allowed in the charter or a shareholders agreement, investors run the risk that courts refuse to enforce the arbitration provision.",
     "year": "2004",
     "source": "Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro",
     "citation": "Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law after Inspire Art Unbundling Delaware's Product for Euro (2004). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617681"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1558614-019",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1558614-019",
     "claim": "Because the Aufsichtsrat owes its duty of loyalty to the firm rather than to shareholders alone, and because non shareholder constituencies such as employees and creditors are more risk averse than diversified shareholders, German supervisory boards may take a more conservative attitude toward risk than U.S. shareholder oriented boards.",
     "year": "2010",
     "source": "Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in",
     "citation": "Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1908473-029",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-029",
     "claim": "Information asymmetries between market participants and a systemically important institution's management before default can be reduced if a financial weakening after conversion of contingent capital triggers a voting rights increase.",
     "year": "2011",
     "source": "Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1908473-031",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-031",
     "claim": "German corporate law permits increases in voting rights only in very limited circumstances, such as grandfathered multiple voting shares, so the proposed voting rights increase would require statutory reform in Germany.",
     "year": "2011",
     "source": "Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473"
    }
   ]
  },
  {
   "topic": "decentralization",
   "label": "Decentralization theory, recentralization dynamics",
   "claims": 625,
   "works": 87,
   "first_publication_year": 2013,
   "most_recent_year": 2026,
   "failure_mode_claims": 257,
   "failure_families_covered": [
    "recentralization-drift",
    "collective-action-and-coordination-failure",
    "scalability-and-throughput-limit",
    "cold-start-and-bootstrapping",
    "reputation-system-gaming",
    "adoption-and-usability-barrier",
    "plutocratic-capture",
    "rule-obsolescence-and-ossification"
   ],
   "topic_slice": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/by-topic/decentralization.json",
   "representative_claims": [
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2267560-012",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-012",
     "claim": "Rules can be adaptable only if the institutions and rulemaking processes that produce them integrate dynamic elements that generate timely, relevant, and decentralized information for rulemaking.",
     "year": "2013",
     "source": "Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2267560-015",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-015",
     "claim": "Under dynamic regulation a presumption of reform feasibility is unnecessary because the feedback effect makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete, curtailing centralized planning and minimizing unintended actions.",
     "year": "2013",
     "source": "Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2267560-025",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-025",
     "claim": "Public rulemakers rely on stable and presumptively optimal rules because they lack necessary, comparable, decentralized, and institution-specific information.",
     "year": "2013",
     "source": "Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2267560-027",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-027",
     "claim": "Private rulemakers can work with and utilize decentralized information continuously, which enables them to react in a timely fashion to emerging, decentralized, and institution-specific information, while public rulemakers are limited in the information they can obtain.",
     "year": "2013",
     "source": "Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2267560-032",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-032",
     "claim": "Information exchange between agents of public rulemakers, such as regulators, will not necessarily involve decentralized information, unlike feedback effects between private and public rulemakers.",
     "year": "2013",
     "source": "Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2273857-062",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-062",
     "claim": "The institution specific and decentralized information generated by deferred prosecution agreements allows regulators to better understand shortcomings in a particular market segment or industry, so that rulemaking can be more narrowly tailored.",
     "year": "2013",
     "source": "Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857"
    }
   ]
  },
  {
   "topic": "dynamic-regulation",
   "label": "Dynamic regulation and regulatory lag",
   "claims": 285,
   "works": 48,
   "first_publication_year": 2009,
   "most_recent_year": 2026,
   "failure_mode_claims": 97,
   "failure_families_covered": [
    "regulatory-lag",
    "rule-obsolescence-and-ossification",
    "enforcement-gap",
    "supervisory-capacity-gap",
    "definitional-ambiguity",
    "trigger-design-failure",
    "innovation-chilling",
    "harmonization-and-standardization-failure"
   ],
   "topic_slice": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/by-topic/dynamic-regulation.json",
   "representative_claims": [
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1428387-001",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1428387-001",
     "claim": "A uniform approach to hedge fund valuation is not possible because the variety of hedge fund investments and strategies means some positions, such as non-concentrated positions in liquid securities, are far easier to value than others.",
     "year": "2009",
     "source": "Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability",
     "citation": "Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:1998455-027",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-027",
     "claim": "Where jurisdictions are not compelled to agree on the same rule, some jurisdiction will try a different rule, and will do so more quickly, when changed economic circumstances make a different rule optimal.",
     "year": "2012",
     "source": "Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2267560-002",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-002",
     "claim": "Dynamic elements in the rulemaking process increase the availability of relevant information for rulemaking and thereby improve institutional design.",
     "year": "2013",
     "source": "Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework",
     "citation": "Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560"
    },
    {
     "id": "kaal:claim:2267560-007",
     "url": "https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-007",
     "claim": "The feedback effect between different public rulemakers and between private and public rulemakers reduces incomplete information, which in turn enables the rulemaker to modify the next action in the rulemaking process.",
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