# kaal:claim:1428387-021

**Claim.** The principal-agent problem in complex financial products is exacerbated by hierarchies in financial institutions, which create multiple layers of agency relationships between the traders using the products and the principals bearing the real economic risk.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- in banks and large institutions trading complex financial products

**Source quote.**

> The principal-agent problem is further exacerbated by hierarchies in financial institutions that often create multiple layers of agency relationships to trade and invest in complex financial products.

**From.** Kaal, *Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability* (2009), V.A.1 Hierarchies in Financial Institutions, page 41

**Cite as.** Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability (2009). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1428387

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `6aa3a280dc6750723be2389f3af2aabf3a16c4ce20e49fcdaddd7f2ea95a67aa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202009%20-%20Hedge%20Fund%20Valuation%20Retailization%2C%20Regulation%2C%20and%20Investor%20Suitability.pdf

**Topics.** ai-and-agents, corporate-governance, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** principal-agent, moral-hazard, financial-hierarchies, complex-instruments

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.
