# kaal:claim:1558614-003

**Claim.** Contesting the view that the 2008 crisis was an American problem inflicted on foreign victims, the authors argue that non U.S. institutions such as German banks were willing participants in the risk taking, even where they did not fully understand the risks they assumed.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- applies to European banks that bought or sponsored U.S. structured credit products

**Source quote.**

> The experience of German banks with CDOs, however, revealed that some of the non- U.S. victims were willing participants in the risk, even if they did not always fully understand the risks.

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), I.A. The Financial Crisis in the United States and Germany, page 5

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, systemic-risk

**Keywords.** comparative-finance, risk-taking, german-banks, financial-crisis-2008, moral-responsibility

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.