# kaal:claim:1558614-004

**Claim.** Beliefs about whether markets fail are causally consequential rather than merely academic: bankers who believe markets fail invest more cautiously, and regulators who believe markets fail regulate more aggressively.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- holds across both national settings the authors compare

**Source quote.**

> Bankers who believe that markets fail may be more cautious when investing in markets, and regulators who believe that markets fail may be more aggressive when regulating markets.

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), I.B. The Issues Confronting the United States and Germany, page 8

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Topics.** economics, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** market-failure, regulatory-belief, comparative-regulation, risk-perception

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