# kaal:claim:1558614-008

**Claim.** Because German banks absorbed both the 2008 credit crisis and the 2010 sovereign debt crisis while American banks faced only the first, German regulators and bankers are likely to impose stricter substantive risk management rules than countries that faced only one of those shocks.

**Type.** predictive  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- written before the sovereign debt crisis had fully played out
- assumes the two shocks compound rather than offset

**Source quote.**

> German banks, like Ameri- can banks, have been exposed to the 2008 credit crisis, and unlike their American rivals, German banks also face a second threat in their exposure to the 2010 sovereign debt crisis

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), I.B. The Issues Confronting the United States and Germany, page 12

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Topics.** systemic-risk, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** sovereign-debt-crisis, german-banks, regulatory-divergence, risk-management

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