# kaal:claim:1558614-010

**Claim.** The same combination of substantive and procedural rules imposes different monitoring costs in different cultural settings, so a rule package that is cheap in one country can be expensive in another.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- illustrative cost model rather than measured data

**Source quote.**

> The cultural context also matters; a particular combination of substantive and procedural rules in one setting—for example, the U.S.—may result in a sharply rising solid line whereas the same combination in another setting

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), II. Cost vs. Benefit from the Directors' Duty to Monitor Risk, page 15

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Topics.** law-and-legal-systems, compliance

**Keywords.** legal-transplants, regulatory-cost, comparative-regulation, duty-to-monitor, culture

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