# kaal:claim:1558614-011

**Claim.** A country whose bankers do not embrace intentional risk taking is still exposed to risk, both through the collateral effects of intentional risk taking abroad and through unintentional risk taking at home, so domestic cultural restraint is not a sufficient safeguard.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- open financial systems with cross border bank activity

**Source quote.**

> Countries where bankers do not typically embrace intentional risk taking are still vulnerable to collateral effects of intentional risk taking in other countries as well as unintentional risk taking in their own financial institutions

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), III. Cultural Components of Risk Taking and Controlling Risk, page 16

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Failure mode.** imported risk exposure  (family: systemic-risk-transmission)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, systemic-risk, dynamic-regulation

**Keywords.** risk-culture, cross-border-contagion, unintentional-risk, regulatory-design

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