# kaal:claim:1558614-015

**Claim.** German corporate law's historical focus on conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders leaves it poorly equipped to address managerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- systems where ownership is concentrated and the central conflict is shareholder against shareholder

**Source quote.**

> Ar- guably, a legal system that focuses on the interaction of controlling and minority shareholders is not as well equipped to deal with mana- gerial abuse of power, including excessive risk taking by managers.

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), III. Cultural Components of Risk Taking and Controlling Risk, page 22

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Failure mode.** misaimed conflict focus  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** corporate-governance, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** german-corporate-law, minority-shareholders, managerial-agency, excessive-risk

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