# kaal:claim:1558614-031

**Claim.** The United States compensates for its lenient corporate law treatment of risk taking under the business judgment rule with a comparatively strict disclosure regime and a robust securities class action litigation regime; substantive corporate law pushes the monitoring requirement toward leniency while securities enforcement pushes it back toward stringency.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> In sum, what the United States lacks in its lenient approach to risk taking in the application of the business judgment rule the Unit- ed States may make up for with its relatively strict disclosure regime and robust securities class action litigation regime.

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), IV.C. Securities Disclosure, page 41

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Topics.** securities-law, law-and-legal-systems, disclosure, compliance

**Keywords.** regulatory-substitution, business-judgment-rule, securities-litigation, disclosure, duty-to-monitor

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