# kaal:claim:1558614-032

**Claim.** In the United States the duty to disclose risk indirectly generates risk monitoring, because directors who know they are responsible for disclosing risk have reason to monitor it even though corporate law imposes no explicit duty to monitor.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- risk must be of a kind that securities law requires to be disclosed

**Source quote.**

> Directors thus may monitor for risk because they know they are responsible for dis- closing it.

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), IV.C. Securities Disclosure, page 41

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, disclosure, corporate-governance, law-and-legal-systems, securities-law

**Keywords.** duty-to-monitor, disclosure, director-liability, securities-law

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