# kaal:claim:1558614-034

**Claim.** The U.S. approach left both of its risk controls ineffective: the securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, while the expansive business judgment rule that permitted the risk taking in the first place survived the crisis unchanged.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> The much-touted U.S. securities disclosure regime failed to prevent the 2008 financial crisis, yet the expansive U.S. version of the business judgment rule in cor- porate law that allowed the risk taking to begin with has remained in- tact.

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), IV.C. Securities Disclosure, page 41

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Failure mode.** double failure of U.S. risk control  (family: supervisory-capacity-gap)

**Topics.** disclosure

**Keywords.** disclosure-failure, business-judgment-rule, financial-crisis-2008, regulatory-reform

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