# kaal:claim:1558614-038

**Claim.** Dodd-Frank's mandatory risk committee is a significant change because most boards then delegated risk oversight to the audit committee, and it may generate new litigation if committee composition or alleged committee failure becomes a basis for shareholder suits.

**Type.** predictive  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- publicly traded non bank financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve and bank holding companies with more than $10 billion in assets

**Source quote.**

> This requirement also could result in more litigation if the composition of the risk committee or its alleged fail- ure to do its job appropriately becomes a basis for additional share- holder suits.

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), IV.D. Other Recent Developments, page 52

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, corporate-governance, law-and-legal-systems

**Keywords.** dodd-frank, risk-committee, board-structure, shareholder-litigation

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