# kaal:claim:1558614-040

**Claim.** Because of the political climate and concern about the social externalities of business failure, monitoring requirements and their enforcement procedures are likely to become more severe regardless of whether the increased monitoring costs are offset by fewer bad business decisions.

**Type.** predictive  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- post crisis political climate in both Germany and the United States
- the company's own cost perspective may not govern

**Source quote.**

> The severity of the substantive moni- toring requirement and the procedures used to enforce it may in- crease regardless of net costs to the company.

**From.** Painter and Kaal, *Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in* (2010), V. Conclusion, page 53

**Cite as.** Painter and Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in (2010). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1558614

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e898211630f4116879329d6de8397523dca5b066864147421aa5cbc7429dc83b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Painter%20and%20Kaal%20-%202010%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20an%20Evolving%20Standard%20Constraints%20on%20Risk%20Taking%20by%20Directors%20and%20Officers%20in.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, economics

**Keywords.** duty-to-monitor, regulatory-cost, political-economy, social-externalities

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