# kaal:claim:1765901-028

**Claim.** Section 929P(b) risks complications where the SEC proceeds unilaterally in situations in which coordinated enforcement with foreign regulators would be more effective, for example insider trading cases involving exchanges whose home regimes do not recognize comparable insider trading rules.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- unilateral SEC enforcement over foreign exchange transactions

**Source quote.**

> The provision risks complications if the SEC pursues cases unilaterally when coordinated enforcement with foreign regulators would be more effective.

**From.** Kaal and Painter, *The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche* (2011), III. The Dodd-Frank Act; 2. Was Section 929P(b) Necessary?, page 20

**Cite as.** Kaal and Painter, The Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1765901

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7b08b8a15f7d72b4eeed41be2d17c20428cb4727269077a6575c5d22e31ecdc5` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Painter%20-%202011%20-%20The%20Aftermath%20of%20Morrison%20v.%20National%20Australia%20Bank%20and%20Elliott%20Associates%20v.%20Porsche.pdf

**Failure mode.** unilateral-enforcement-risk  (family: other)

**Topics.** securities-law, compliance, institutional-design

**Keywords.** sec-enforcement, regulatory-coordination, insider-trading, comity

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.