# kaal:claim:1806252-009

**Claim.** Regulators who obtain hedge funds' proprietary information could inadvertently pass it to third parties, and because that information is highly valuable to competitors in the same markets, such leakage could undermine trading strategies and the long-term viability of hedge funds.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- mandatory disclosure of trading positions and strategies to regulators

**Source quote.**

> The confidential nature of this information makes it highly valuable for third parties who engage in the same markets as the owner of the proprietary information, and this form of leakage could undermine trading strategies and the long-term viability of hedge funds.

**From.** Kaal, *Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III* (2011), III.2.c.1 Increased Disclosure Obligations, page 39

**Cite as.** Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `3343ebfe05a925c3d1a75625c4b351ccff515c50819a48d155804daacf01429d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202011%20-%20Hedge%20Fund%20Regulation%20Via%20Basel%20III.pdf

**Failure mode.** regulator-information-leakage  (family: other)

**Topics.** disclosure, private-funds

**Keywords.** disclosure, regulatory-leakage, proprietary-information, hedge-funds, dodd-frank

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.