# kaal:claim:1806252-012

**Claim.** Banks are ideally positioned to deal with asymmetric information, moral hazard, and systemic issues pertaining to hedge funds, which is why hedge fund regulation should run through bank regulation.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Banks are ideally positioned to deal with asymmetric information, moral hazard, and systemic issues pertaining to hedge funds.

**From.** Kaal, *Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III* (2011), V.4 Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, page 68

**Cite as.** Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `3343ebfe05a925c3d1a75625c4b351ccff515c50819a48d155804daacf01429d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202011%20-%20Hedge%20Fund%20Regulation%20Via%20Basel%20III.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, systemic-risk

**Keywords.** indirect-regulation, asymmetric-information, moral-hazard, bank-intermediation

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