# kaal:claim:1806252-031

**Claim.** Banks' role in monitoring hedge funds is not easily comparable to the principal agent problem between securities buyers and credit rating agencies, because banks have more influence over hedge funds than securities buyers have over rating agencies and their ratings.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Banks have perhaps more influence over hedge funds than buyers of securities over credit rating agencies and their ratings.

**From.** Kaal, *Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III* (2011), V.4 Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, page 73

**Cite as.** Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation Via Basel III (2011). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1806252

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `3343ebfe05a925c3d1a75625c4b351ccff515c50819a48d155804daacf01429d` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202011%20-%20Hedge%20Fund%20Regulation%20Via%20Basel%20III.pdf

**Topics.** ai-and-agents, corporate-governance, systemic-risk, compliance, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** credit-rating-agencies, principal-agent, bank-monitoring, incentives

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.