# kaal:claim:1908473-010

**Claim.** Contingent capital offers only limited protection against information asymmetries, principal and agent conflicts, and collective action problems, so it cannot by itself prevent economic failure.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Contingent capital can only limitedly protect against information asymmetries, principal/agent issues, and collective action problems.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, *Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers* (2011), II.B. Limitations and Open Issues, page 19

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Henkel%20-%202011%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20with%20Sequential%20Triggers.pdf

**Failure mode.** limited-protection-scope  (family: information-asymmetry)

**Topics.** disclosure, ai-and-agents, corporate-governance, institutional-design, contingent-capital

**Keywords.** information-asymmetry, principal-agent, collective-action, contingent-capital-limits

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.