# kaal:claim:1908473-011

**Claim.** Existing proposals for implementing contingent capital do not explain how they would address the information asymmetries and principal and agent problems that may lie at the core of the credit crisis.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Assumes information asymmetries and principal agent problems were central causes of the crisis

**Source quote.**

> Although contingent capital has many beneficial attributes, existing proposals for implementing contingent capital are unclear as to how they will address information asymmetries and principal/agent problems.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, *Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers* (2011), II.B. Limitations and Open Issues, page 20

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Henkel%20-%202011%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20with%20Sequential%20Triggers.pdf

**Failure mode.** unaddressed-agency-problems  (family: governance-participation-collapse)

**Topics.** disclosure, ai-and-agents, corporate-governance, contingent-capital

**Keywords.** information-asymmetry, principal-agent, contingent-capital-limits, financial-crisis

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.