# kaal:claim:1908473-022

**Claim.** Although the EU debt write-down proposal gives regulators certainty and discretion, it could produce greater market uncertainty, raise costs, and have the unintended effect of increasing the size of financial institutions.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Applies to the debt write-down element of the EU Commission proposal

**Source quote.**

> Although the concept may provide greater certainty and discretion to regulators, it could result in greater market uncertainty, which is likely to increase costs, and could have the unintended effect of actually increasing the size of financial institutions.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, *Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers* (2011), III.B. The Targeted Approach, page 30

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Henkel%20-%202011%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20with%20Sequential%20Triggers.pdf

**Failure mode.** write-down-concentration-effect  (family: systemic-risk-transmission)

**Topics.** systemic-risk, contingent-capital

**Keywords.** bail-in, debt-write-down, unintended-consequences, eu-commission

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2061166-024

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.