# kaal:claim:1908473-024

**Claim.** Departing from Coffee's design, super-voting rights should be allocated to contingent capital holders only if the first trigger failed to improve the institution's financial health; at the first trigger the new shareholder gets one vote per share.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Voting rights escalate only on a continuing downward trend after the first conversion

**Source quote.**

> Although we agree with the need for increased voting rights, the proposal in this Article would allocate super-voting rights to CCS holders only if the first trigger did not result in an improvement of the financial institution's financial health.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, *Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers* (2011), IV.A. First Trigger: Debt-Equity Conversion, page 34

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Henkel%20-%202011%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20with%20Sequential%20Triggers.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, contingent-capital

**Keywords.** voting-rights, super-voting, sequential-triggers, coffee-proposal

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