# kaal:claim:1908473-025

**Claim.** To balance constituent incentives and prevent abuse, the voting rights increase should be calibrated so that contingent capital holders obtain a majority stake only in combination with the largest institutional shareholder.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Change of control limited to the case where the first trigger failed

**Source quote.**

> To balance the constituents' incentives and avoid abuse,194 the voting rights increase could be calibrated to give CCS holders a majority stake in the company only with, for instance, the largest institutional shareholder.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, *Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers* (2011), IV.A. First Trigger: Debt-Equity Conversion, page 35

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Henkel%20-%202011%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20with%20Sequential%20Triggers.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, institutional-design

**Keywords.** voting-rights, institutional-investors, change-of-control, abuse-prevention

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-034
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-033

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