# kaal:claim:1908473-033

**Claim.** Exchange uniform voting rights policies should not be applied to contingent capital securities, and the NYSE and Nasdaq would themselves benefit from an exemption because it could increase marketability and trading on each exchange.

**Type.** normative  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Exchange policies allow dual class capitalization but bar midstream dilutive changes in voting rights

**Source quote.**

> we believe these restrictions should not be applied to CCS. NYSE and Nasdaq would benefit from exempting CCS from their respective policies because an exemption from the policies could increase the marketability and the trading on each exchange.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, *Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers* (2011), IV.B.2.b. U.S. Law, page 44

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Henkel%20-%202011%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20with%20Sequential%20Triggers.pdf

**Topics.** defi, governance-design, economics

**Keywords.** stock-exchanges, voting-rights-policy, marketability, regulatory-exemption

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