# kaal:claim:1908473-036

**Claim.** Contingent capital with increased voting rights delivers a more flexible and efficient outcome than Chapter 11, because it requires neither court involvement nor a threshold of creditor approval.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Contingent capital holders with increased voting rights hold powers comparable to a creditors' committee

**Source quote.**

> The proposal in this Article would, however, create a far more flexible and efficient solution than Chapter 11. Neither court involvement nor a threshold of creditor approval would be required.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, *Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers* (2011), VI.A. Debtor in Possession and Creditors' Committees, page 51

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Henkel%20-%202011%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20with%20Sequential%20Triggers.pdf

**Topics.** economics

**Keywords.** chapter-11, efficiency, creditor-committees, reorganization

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