# kaal:claim:1908473-039

**Claim.** Contingent capital is more efficient than prepackaged plans or preplan sales because it provides a resolution mechanism outside formal proceedings and free of their restrictions, since the Bankruptcy Code does not regulate conversion or the use of increased voting rights.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Contingent capital securities are for the most part privately negotiated contracts

**Source quote.**

> CCS could be more efficient because CCS could provide the basis for a resolution mechanism outside of formal resolution proceedings and without the restrictions of prepackaged plans or preplan sales. The Bankruptcy Code does not regulate CCS conversion or the use of increased voting rights.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, *Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers* (2011), VI.B. Contingent Capital in Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans and Preplan Sales, page 54

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Christoph Henkel, Contingent Capital with Sequential Triggers (2011). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1908473

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `9d578dac663357529edd1f6453fcfe69bdc59ac882408d9edfde5a4c2916befa` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Henkel%20-%202011%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20with%20Sequential%20Triggers.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, economics

**Keywords.** preplan-sales, prepackaged-plans, private-ordering, efficiency

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