# kaal:claim:1998455-004

**Claim.** Because both European regulatory initiatives and the United States academic debate concentrate on the technical design features of contingent capital securities, the possible corporate governance applications of those securities are mostly ignored.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** asserted

**Holds when.**

- state of the debate as of 2012 in Europe and the United States

**Source quote.**

> Regulatory initiatives in Europe and the academic debate in the United States focus on improving the technical design fea- tures of contingent capital securities. Given the importance of technical design features, possible applications of CCS for corpo- rate governance are mostly ignored.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance* (2012), I. Introduction, page 9

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Possible%20Application%20of%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, governance-design, corporate-governance, dynamic-regulation

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, corporate-governance, regulatory-design, academic-debate

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-058

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