# kaal:claim:1998455-011

**Claim.** Trigger designs can be ranked by the certainty they give market participants: institution specific triggers presumably grant the most certainty, while regulatory trigger designs provide lower levels of certainty.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- comparing institution specific triggers against regulatory or systemic triggers

**Source quote.**

> While institution-specific triggers would presum- ably grant most certainty to market participants, regulatory trig- ger designs could provide lower levels of certainty.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance* (2012), III.B. Unresolved Design Issues, page 23

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Possible%20Application%20of%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, economics

**Keywords.** trigger-design, contingent-capital, regulatory-certainty, market-participants

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