# kaal:claim:1998455-017

**Claim.** Contingent capital rules could contribute to overriding the moral reasoning of decision makers, in which case contingent capital would actually increase, not reduce, risk incentives for institutions that are too big to fail.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- where decision makers operate under an illusion of heightened protection
- where the underlying contingent capital design is flawed

**Source quote.**

> This could mean that contingent capital rules could actually contribute to overriding decision maker's moral reasoning. In that case, contingent capital could actually increase risk incentives for SI- FIs that are too big to fail.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance* (2012), IV.A. Adverse Effects, page 33

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Possible%20Application%20of%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** moral-reasoning-crowd-out  (family: moral-hazard-and-bailout-expectation)

**Topics.** contingent-capital, risk-and-incentives, systemic-risk

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, moral-crowding-out, risk-incentives, too-big-to-fail, failure-modes

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-015

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