# kaal:claim:1998455-022

**Claim.** Absent cross holdings, the opposite conflict arises: institutions holding a competitor's converted contingent capital could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of that competitor.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- where a SIFI holds a competitor's CCS without a reciprocal position
- after a conversion to equity has been triggered

**Source quote.**

> Without CCS cross holdings, SIFIs could be tempted to exercise their voting rights against the interests of the competitor if a con- version to equity should have been triggered.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance* (2012), IV.B. Conflicts of Interest, page 35

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Possible%20Application%20of%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Failure mode.** adversarial-competitor-voting  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** governance-design, contingent-capital, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** voting-rights, conflicts-of-interest, competitors, contingent-capital, corporate-governance

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.