# kaal:claim:1998455-038

**Claim.** Rather than banning purchases by systemically important institutions of each other's contingent capital, which could be detrimental to market evolution, the design should require disclosure of the purchaser's identity and approval by the issuer.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- where the concern is competitors acquiring voting rights as equity holders upon conversion

**Source quote.**

> An outright ban of SIFI CCS purchases, or at least purchases in other SIFI CCS issuances, could be detrimental for CCS mar- ket evolution. Perhaps a mechanism that requires disclosure of the identity of the purchaser for SIFIs and approval by the issuer could address these concerns.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance* (2012), VII.D. Additional Considerations, page 48

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Possible%20Application%20of%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Topics.** disclosure, economics, institutional-design

**Keywords.** disclosure, cross-holdings, ccs-design, issuer-approval, market-evolution

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