# kaal:claim:1998455-040

**Claim.** Contingent capital can facilitate an incentive structure that lets regulators rely partially on private party contracting for the design of these securities while still accounting for systemic risk.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- where a general regulatory framework enables rather than displaces private ordering

**Source quote.**

> Contingent capital could help fa- cilitate an incentive structure that allows regulators to rely par- tially on private party contracting for the design of CCS to ac- count for systemic risk.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance* (2012), VIII. Conclusion, page 50

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent Capital in Corporate Governance (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1998455

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1c16ff10a284469ba15fb7ba5523449b917388ee692d9b394f9e8c094544e32c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Initial%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Possible%20Application%20of%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, dynamic-regulation, systemic-risk, contingent-capital

**Keywords.** private-ordering, regulatory-design, systemic-risk, contingent-capital, incentives

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-058

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