# kaal:claim:2029983-009

**Claim.** Harmonization invites its own defeat by creating an incentive for rogue jurisdictions to attract, into their legal systems, the private actors who do not agree with the harmonized rule.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- applies even within organized communities of jurisdictions such as the European Union

**Source quote.**

> Third, harmonization invites efforts to undermine harmony by "rogue" jurisdictions that seek to benefit by attracting to their legal systems private actors who do not agree with the harmonization.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, *Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral* (2012), I.A. The Harmonization Alternative, page 17

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Painter%20-%202012%20-%20Forum%20Competition%20and%20Choice%20of%20Law%20Competition%20in%20Securities%20Law%20after%20Morrison%20v.%20National%20Austral.pdf

**Failure mode.** rogue-jurisdiction-defection  (family: harmonization-and-standardization-failure)

**Topics.** regulatory-failure, institutional-design

**Keywords.** harmonization, regulatory-arbitrage, collective-action-problem, defection

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