# kaal:claim:2029983-014

**Claim.** Government enforcement acts as a backstop that makes the case for choice of law freedom stronger: allowing parties to choose their legal regime is more defensible when bad choices, such as moving transactions to regimes with little regulation, do not thwart government enforcement.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- SEC and DOJ retain extraterritorial enforcement power under Section 929P

**Source quote.**

> The ar- gument for allowing choice of law freedom for transacting par- ties is more persuasive when bad choices by contracting par- ties—such as moving securities transactions offshore to regimes with little or no regulation—do not thwart enforcement action by government authorities.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, *Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral* (2012), I.C. Bifurcated Jurisdictional Competition in Securities Law, page 22

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Painter%20-%202012%20-%20Forum%20Competition%20and%20Choice%20of%20Law%20Competition%20in%20Securities%20Law%20after%20Morrison%20v.%20National%20Austral.pdf

**Topics.** law-and-legal-systems, compliance

**Keywords.** race-to-the-bottom, choice-of-law, government-enforcement, dodd-frank-929p

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