# kaal:claim:2029983-016

**Claim.** Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts, which in turn depresses settlement amounts and damages awards.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- European collective procedures that require plaintiffs to opt in

**Source quote.**

> Without an opt-out mechanism, European class sizes will likely be substantially smaller than their U.S. counterparts.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, *Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral* (2012), II. Forum Competition After Morrison, page 24

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Painter%20-%202012%20-%20Forum%20Competition%20and%20Choice%20of%20Law%20Competition%20in%20Securities%20Law%20after%20Morrison%20v.%20National%20Austral.pdf

**Failure mode.** opt-in-class-size-ceiling  (family: enforcement-gap)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** opt-out, class-size, collective-procedures, europe, settlements

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