# kaal:claim:2029983-020

**Claim.** The WCAM's requirement that a court evaluate procedural and substantive fairness and the efficiency of the settlement lets the Dutch system avoid blackmail settlements, where a defendant pays simply to escape endless proceedings and reputational loss.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Dutch collective settlements certified by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal

**Source quote.**

> The WCAM, thus, avoids black- mail settlements in which a defendant offers a payment to get out of a class action to avoid the prospect of endless proceedings

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, *Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral* (2012), II.B.1. The Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims, page 36

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Richard W. Painter, Forum Competition and Choice of Law Competition in Securities Law after Morrison v. National Austral (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2029983

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `fde2ff611420eb283cbb49a6b681a2ae8efa2b4603ae71480e2d91483f0295f2` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Painter%20-%202012%20-%20Forum%20Competition%20and%20Choice%20of%20Law%20Competition%20in%20Securities%20Law%20after%20Morrison%20v.%20National%20Austral.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** wcam, netherlands, settlements, blackmail-settlements, class-actions

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