# kaal:claim:2061166-001

**Claim.** Where bank resolution regimes are not coordinated across jurisdictions, the same systemically important financial institution can be handled in opposite ways: it might petition for reorganization under German law and emerge leaner and more competitive, while its United States operations are liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- SIFIs with operations in multiple countries
- absent coordination and convergence of resolution regimes

**Source quote.**

> it is possible that a SIFI with operations in multiple countries could petition for reorganization under German law, for instance, and emerge as a more competitive and leaner business while the same SIFI in the United States may be liquidated under the Boxer Amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act.

**From.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring* (2012), I. INTRODUCTION, page 6

**Cite as.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Henkel%20and%20Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20European%20Union%20Bank%20Restructuring.pdf

**Failure mode.** Uncoordinated cross-border resolution of a single SIFI  (family: jurisdictional-conflict)

**Topics.** systemic-risk, regulatory-failure

**Keywords.** bank-resolution, regulatory-arbitrage, sifi, cross-border-insolvency, dodd-frank

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