# kaal:claim:2061166-005

**Claim.** Because most national crisis responses took the form of public bail-outs adopted without broad international consensus, they increased the threat of international regulatory arbitrage and damaged the global competitiveness of national financial markets.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- crisis-era emergency measures adopted without international coordination

**Source quote.**

> Most national measures took the form of public bail-outs without broad international consensus,44 thereby increasing the threat of international regulatory arbitrage as well as negatively impacting the global competitiveness of national financial markets.

**From.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring* (2012), II. INTERNATIONAL MITIGATION INITIATIVES, RESOLUTION TOOLS AND FRAMEWORKS, page 9

**Cite as.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Henkel%20and%20Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20European%20Union%20Bank%20Restructuring.pdf

**Failure mode.** Uncoordinated bail-outs breed regulatory arbitrage  (family: regulatory-arbitrage)

**Topics.** systemic-risk, regulatory-failure, institutional-design

**Keywords.** public-bailouts, regulatory-arbitrage, competitiveness, international-coordination

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