# kaal:claim:2061166-009

**Claim.** Placing bank reorganization in the hands of an administrative supervisory authority rather than a bankruptcy court, as Swiss law does, trades better sector knowledge and a faster procedure against the cost of very broad agency discretion.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- civil law jurisdictions where the supervisor is also the resolution authority
- Swiss Federal Law on Banks and Savings and Loans

**Source quote.**

> The perceived advantage is better knowledge of the banking sector that may result in a more efficient and expeditious procedure. The clear disadvantage is the broad discretion of the agency in overseeing financial institutions.

**From.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring* (2012), 1. Bank Reorganization under Swiss Law, page 29

**Cite as.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Henkel%20and%20Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20European%20Union%20Bank%20Restructuring.pdf

**Topics.** systemic-risk

**Keywords.** swiss-law, resolution-authority, administrative-discretion, bank-reorganization

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