# kaal:claim:2061166-013

**Claim.** The German voluntary reorganization procedure has a structural gap: groups of financial institutions, financial holding groups and conglomerates cannot petition for protection under it, even though these are precisely the entities that qualify as systemically important and pose the highest risk to market stability on failure.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- voluntary reorganization procedure under the German Financial Institution Reorganization Act
- not applicable to the involuntary procedure initiated by the supervisor under the German Banking Act

**Source quote.**

> Unlike the involuntary reorganization procedure initiated by the Supervisory Authority under the German Banking Act,333 groups of financial institutions, financial holding groups, or conglomerates are not eligible to petition for protection under the voluntary reorganization procedure.

**From.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring* (2012), (ii) Reorganization Procedure, page 39

**Cite as.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Henkel%20and%20Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20European%20Union%20Bank%20Restructuring.pdf

**Failure mode.** Group structures excluded from voluntary reorganization  (family: enforcement-gap)

**Topics.** systemic-risk

**Keywords.** german-banking-law, sifi, group-structures, reorganization-eligibility

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.