# kaal:claim:2061166-015

**Claim.** Because the amendments to the German Banking Act sharply increase the supervisor's intervention powers, the prospect that any systemically important bank would voluntarily petition under the German stabilization or reorganization procedure is remote at best.

**Type.** predictive  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- systemically important banks in Germany
- after the increase of BaFin intervention powers, which also reach groups, financial holdings and conglomerates

**Source quote.**

> Furthermore, in context of these increased powers the likelihood that any systemically important bank may file a voluntary petition under the German stabilization or reorganization procedure seems remote at best.

**From.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring* (2012), (b) Regulatory intervention powers and procedures, page 45

**Cite as.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Henkel%20and%20Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20European%20Union%20Bank%20Restructuring.pdf

**Failure mode.** Expanded supervisory powers deter voluntary petitions  (family: trigger-design-failure)

**Topics.** systemic-risk

**Keywords.** german-banking-law, bafin, voluntary-petition, supervisory-powers, sifi

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