# kaal:claim:2061166-024

**Claim.** Implementing the European Commission's debt write-down proposal has the potential to increase funding costs for financial institutions and to make their funding more volatile.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- statutory bail-in regime as proposed by the Commission

**Source quote.**

> The implementation of the debt write-down in the European Commission proposal also has the potential of increasing funding costs for financial institutions475 and could make funding more volatile.

**From.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring* (2012), A. European Commission Proposal, page 56

**Cite as.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Henkel%20and%20Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20European%20Union%20Bank%20Restructuring.pdf

**Failure mode.** Bail-in raises and destabilizes bank funding  (family: systemic-risk-transmission)

**Topics.** systemic-risk, contingent-capital

**Keywords.** bail-in, funding-costs, funding-volatility, european-commission, unintended-consequences

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-022

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.