# kaal:claim:2061166-029

**Claim.** Building critical mass in the contingent capital securities market could require banks and other financial institutions to buy their competitors' contingent capital securities, which would raise ethical, antitrust and incentive concerns.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- where non-bank demand is insufficient to absorb issuance volumes

**Source quote.**

> Developing a critical mass for the market in contingent capital securities could require banks and other financial institutions to purchase their competitors' contingent capital securities.533 That could raise ethical, antitrust, and incentive concerns.

**From.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring* (2012), A. Trigger Events, Uncertainty, Market Development, page 65

**Cite as.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Henkel%20and%20Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20European%20Union%20Bank%20Restructuring.pdf

**Failure mode.** Cross-holding of contingent capital among competitors  (family: systemic-risk-transmission)

**Topics.** contingent-capital, reputation, economics, systemic-risk, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, interconnectedness, antitrust, market-development, systemic-risk

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-020

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.