# kaal:claim:2061166-036

**Claim.** Using contingent capital as a preventative tool does not foreclose the statutory core power or the debt write-down tool within resolution; if early contractual write-down and conversion fail, authorities remain free to intervene and impose a haircut on shareholders, debt investors and other private parties.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- contractual conversion at an early stage that does not achieve the desired result

**Source quote.**

> Contingent capital as a preventative tool would not impede the statutory core power or debt write-down tool of bail-inables within resolution.

**From.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring* (2012), VI. CONTINGENT CAPITAL AS A PREVENTATIVE TOOL IN EUROPEAN UNION BANK RESTRUCTURING, page 71

**Cite as.** Christoph K. Henkel, Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in European Union Bank Restructuring (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2061166

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `43625ea260d0fc045e86d3435df50c9d0ca4abf8542e6085a6165be6653b4a7b` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Henkel%20and%20Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20European%20Union%20Bank%20Restructuring.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, systemic-risk

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, bail-in, resolution-powers, prevention, complementarity

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