# kaal:claim:2097160-001

**Claim.** Early European initiatives to put contingent convertible bonds into executive pay lack governance-improving designs; contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger should be used in executive compensation instead.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- systemically important financial institutions
- executive compensation packages

**Source quote.**

> Early initiatives by European SIFIs to include contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages lack governance-improving designs. This Article suggests the use of contingent convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger in executive compensation.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), Abstract, page 1

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Failure mode.** Governance-blind CoCo compensation designs  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** contingent-capital, corporate-governance, governance-design, systemic-risk

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, executive-compensation, early-trigger, corporate-governance, sifi

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