# kaal:claim:2097160-002

**Claim.** The methodological assumptions of incomplete contract theory improve the analysis of executive compensation arrangements relative to the classical and spot contract models normally used.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> The methodological assumptions of incomplete contract theory can improve the analysis of executive compensation arrangements.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), Abstract, page 1

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Topics.** economics, institutional-design, corporate-governance, research-methods

**Keywords.** incomplete-contracts, new-institutional-economics, executive-compensation, methodology

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.