# kaal:claim:2097160-003

**Claim.** Contingent convertible bonds placed in executive compensation serve a different purpose than those sold to investors: the point is not capital infusion during a crisis but governance-improving design that optimizes management incentives.

**Type.** definitional  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- contingent convertible bonds held by executives rather than outside investors

**Source quote.**

> bonds issued to investors, the emphasis for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation is not on a capital infusion when the Systematically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) is in a crisis,13 but rather on governance-improving designs to help optimize management's incentives.14

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), I. Introduction, page 6

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, corporate-governance, governance-design, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, executive-compensation, corporate-governance, incentive-design

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