# kaal:claim:2097160-004

**Claim.** The conversion feature of contingent convertible bonds affects corporate governance in a SIFI only if issuance volumes are sufficient and design features are adequate, because the governance effect runs through the threat of dilution of existing equity positions.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- sufficient volume of contingent convertible bond issuance
- adequate design features

**Source quote.**

> If sufficient volumes of contingent convertible bond issuances are combined with adequate design features, the conversion feature of contingent convertible bonds and the threat of dilution of equity positions in SIFIs could affect corporate governance in SIFIs.108

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), III. Contingent Capital, page 24

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, equity-dilution, corporate-governance, issuance-volume

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1908473-009

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