# kaal:claim:2097160-005

**Claim.** Market solutions and private ordering alone are unlikely to produce contingent capital designs that improve corporate governance in SIFIs, because privately negotiated sales so far have not produced governance-sensitive designs.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- market for contingent convertible bonds still in its infancy

**Source quote.**

> It is doubtful if market solutions and private ordering alone will produce contingent capital designs that help improve corporate governance in SIFIs.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), III. Contingent Capital, page 25

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Failure mode.** Private ordering does not yield governance-improving designs  (family: collective-action-and-coordination-failure)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, contingent-capital, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** private-ordering, contingent-capital, regulation, corporate-governance

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