# kaal:claim:2097160-008

**Claim.** Adding contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages creates a corporate governance mechanism that addresses the inability of contractual control rights to constrain executive opportunism.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Adding contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger to executive compensation packages can create a corporate governance mechanism that helps address these shortcomings.128

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), IV. Incomplete Contract Theory, page 29

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** early-trigger, contingent-capital, corporate-governance, opportunism

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