# kaal:claim:2097160-011

**Claim.** A contingent capital award to executives without a conversion feature yields only limited governance improvement and only limited incentive to lower risk-taking; in its current form it operates as a mere compensation supplement.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- contingent capital awards without conversion into equity

**Source quote.**

> Barclays's issuance of contingent convertible bonds without a conversion feature to its executives shows limited governance improvements. Without a conversion to equity, Barclays provides only limited incentives for its executives to lower risk-taking.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), V.A Precedent Barclays, page 33

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Failure mode.** CoCo pay as compensation supplement only  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** contingent-capital, risk-and-incentives, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** barclays, conversion-feature, risk-taking, corporate-governance

**Related claims.**

- specializes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-032

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